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Abstract
Four years ago, the G-7 pushed through an unprecedented initiative forcing the international financial 
institutions to cancel 100 percent of their outstanding debt claims on the world’s poorest countries.  Through 
the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), these heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) stand to receive 
up to $60 billion in debt relief over time.  Moreover, the World Bank, African Development Bank, and IMF 
shareholders approved a new debt sustainability framework to govern future lending decisions and prevent 
the need for yet another round of systemic debt relief.  All parties emerged from these landmark agreements 
confident that the dragon of unsustainable debt finally had been slain.  However, several unsettling trends 
raise serious questions about the finality of these actions.  First, World Bank and AfDB lending disbursement 
volumes to these very same HIPC countries remain very high, and nearly the same as compared to pre-MDRI.   
Emergency IMF lending in response to the global economic crisis has compounded the situation.  Second, 
IMF and World Bank growth projections for HIPCs remain overly rosy compared to actual and historical 
performance.  Our new dataset of IMF growth projections suggests a structural optimism of at least one 
percentage point per year.  Third, HIPCs continue to experience significant volatility in country performance 
measures that has a direct impact on their ability to carry debt sustainably.  Taken together, these findings 
suggest that donor countries should re-examine the issue of debt sustainability in low-income countries and 
the system for determining the appropriate grant/loan mix.  The upcoming IDA and AfDF replenishment 
negotiations present a timely opportunity to do so.  Absent assertive and corrective action, the international 
community may be faced with the prospect of a HIPC IV agreement in the not too distant future.
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The debt burden of low-income countries has been one of the signature issues of the Center 
for Global Development.  Our founding in 2001 was partly motivated by CGD chair Ed 
Scott’s concern over the impact of debt on Latin American’s poor, and our very first book 
was Nancy Birdsall and John Williamson’s Delivering on Debt Relief: From IMF Gold to a 
New Aid Architecture.  The Center has also been actively involved in debt policy toward 
countries initially outside of the HIPC initiative, including Liberia (later included in HIPC), 
Nigeria, and most recently Zimbabwe.   
 
With Norwegian support, CGD is now turning its attention to the remaining debt issues after 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Country and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiatives (HIPC/MDRI).  
One of the principal concerns going forward is whether the lending policies of major 
creditors and donors could lead to yet another round of debt distress and perhaps require 
more debt relief in the future—an outcome HIPC/MDRI was supposed to prevent.  This is 
likely to be a prominent issue on the minds of major creditors during the upcoming IDA-16 
and ADF-12 replenishment negotiations.   
 
As part of CGD’s effort in this area, we are pleased to sponsor this working paper by 
Benjamin Leo, formerly of the U.S. Treasury and National Security Council and a key 
behind-the-scenes player in the inception and implementation of MDRI.  Leo’s paper looks 
at the issue of IFI lending and the potential risk of renewed debt re-accumulation by 
countries that have only recently completed HIPC/MDRI.  His paper specifically examines 
the assumptions that go into lending decisions, especially the GDP growth projections and 
potential weaknesses in the debt sustainability framework, and raises serious concerns about 
the future.  This will be a major contribution to the debate on the lending policies and use of 
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I.  OVERVIEW 
 
In 2005, G-7 nations took the unprecedented step of forcing the World Bank, African 
Development Bank (AfDB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to cancel 100 percent of 
their outstanding debt claims on the world’s poorest countries.  In return, the G-7 and other 
shareholders committed to offset the foregone debt repayments on a dollar-for-dollar basis 
through increased contributions to these institutions over time.  Later the Inter-American 
Development Bank followed suit and cancelled 100 percent of its claims on the five poorest 
countries in the western hemisphere.
1  Through the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, the 
poorest and most heavily indebted countries
2 stand to receive up to $60 billion in debt relief 
over time.  To date, 26 countries have already seen the cancellation of over $45 billion of 
debt obligations.
3  Moreover, the World Bank, AfDB, and IMF shareholders approved a new 
debt sustainability framework to govern future lending decisions and prevent the need for 
systemic debt relief in the future.
4  The international community emerged from these 
agreements confident that the dragon of unsustainable debt finally had been slain. 
 
Four years later, this paper examines whether poor countries’ debt situations have stabilized 
or whether systemic risks of debt distress remain.  In this context, I examine new lending 
volume levels and several interconnected issues that underpin the new debt sustainability 
framework failsafe, such as: (1) GDP and export growth performance; and (2) volatility in 
country performance levels.  I find several striking and unsettling findings: 
 
(1) World Bank and AfDB lending disbursement volumes remain high compared to pre-
debt relief period standards.  And, emergency IMF lending in response to the global 
economic crisis has compounded the situation.  
(2) IMF and World Bank growth projections for HIPCs remain structurally overly-
optimistic compared to actual and historical performance.  This phenomenon may 
have become worse since 2000.   
(3) HIPCs continue to experience significant volatility in country performance measures 
– including numerous cases of deteriorated performance – which has a direct 
correlation with their ability to carry debt sustainably.   
 
Collectively, these findings suggest that shareholders of the IMF, World Bank, and African 
Development Bank should take a fresh look at the issue of debt sustainability in low-income 
countries.  In that examination, they should seriously consider the effectiveness of the 
IMF/World Bank debt sustainability framework as an instrument for preventing the 
resurgence of unsustainable debt levels and the need for yet another round of multilateral 
debt relief.   
                                                 
1 Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
2 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) include: Afghanistan, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Cote Ivoire, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, 
Sao Tome, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. 
3 Source:  Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) – 
Status of Implementation, September 2009, page 39.  Figure is represented in nominal terms. 
4 See World Bank and IMF (2006), Staff Guidance Note on the Application of the Joint Bank-Fund Debt 
Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries. 2   
II.   HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
Over the last twenty-five years, the international community has pursued a series of measures 
to address debt burdens in low-income countries (see appendix I).  Early actions focused on 
debt relief for official bilateral claims, initially via rescheduling, followed by increasing 
levels of debt stock reduction.  During this period, the Paris Club
5 repeatedly reduced or re-
scheduled the debts of a number of countries, including good performers.  Between 1976 and 
2002, low-income countries restructured their Paris Club debt nearly 250 times, with twelve 
countries restructuring eight or more times.
6 
 
In 1996, IMF and World Bank shareholders agreed on the Heavily Indebted Poor Country 
Debt Initiative (HIPC).  For the first time, loans from international financial institutions 
(IFIs) were included in broader debt stock reduction agreements.  For their part, Paris Club 
creditors agreed to so-called “Lyon Terms,” which provided debt stock reduction of up to 80 
percent on eligible non-concessional bilateral claims.  Due to slow implementation and 
continued debt risks, the international donor community agreed to the Enhanced HIPC 
Initiative in 1999.  This initiative sought to provide faster and even deeper debt relief for 
poor countries.  Paris Club creditors agreed to the “Cologne Terms,” canceling up to 90 
percent of eligible non-concessional bilateral obligations.  Some G-7 creditors, including the 
United States, went as far as 100 percent debt reduction on both non-concessional and 
concessional loan obligations.  The overriding objective was to reduce HIPCs’ external debt 
ratios to or below a specific target level (debt/exports ratio of 150 percent).  
 
Even as debt was relieved, HIPCs’ debt sustainability was eroded by even greater new 
official lending – primarily by IFIs.  Between 1989 and 2003, new nominal lending to HIPCs 
more than doubled the amount of nominal debt relief provided ($85 billion versus $38 
billion).  There were several reasons for excessive multilateral lending, including: (1) IFI 
institutional incentives; (2) defensive lending practices (i.e., rolling over preexisting claims 
to prevent default)
7; (3) a need to fill financing gaps created by sudden declines in 
commercial credit
8; and (4) a poor credit culture within the borrowing countries themselves.   
 
Against this backdrop, the G-7 finally took the conclusive and aggressive step in 2005 to 
implement the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative and institute additional IFI reforms in an 
attempt to prevent unsustainable new lending.  Additional use of grants rather than loans 
would protect countries from rebuilding unsustainable debt burdens, and a color-coded 
system would help guide the loans-grants mix for each country.  The underlying concept was 
                                                 
5 The Paris Club is an informal group of official bilateral creditors that seeks coordinated, sustainable solutions 
to the payment difficulties of debtor countries.  Member countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
6 See http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/ for details on country rescheduling treatments. 
7 Birdsall, Nancy, Stijn Claessens, and Ishac Diwan, “Policy Selectivity Foregone: Debt and Donor Behavior in 
Africa,” World Bank Economic Review, Volume 17(3), 2003, 409-435. Originally published as CGD Working 
Paper 17, October 2002. 
8 Easterly, William, “How did the heavily indebted poor countries become heavily indebted? Reviewing 2 
decades of debt relief,” World Development, Volume 30(10), October 2002, 1677-1696. 3   
to wipe the slate clean and proceed afresh with a prudent framework going forward.  So, how 
are we doing? 
 
III.   NEW LENDING VOLUMES 
 
Since 2000, the international community has mobilized tremendous amounts of new 
resources to finance development activities in low-income countries.  This trend accelerated 
with the G-8 commitment at Gleneagles (2005) to double aid to Africa by 2010.  While some 
countries are off-track to meet this commitment, such as France and Italy, overall aid levels 
have increased significantly. 
 
The World Bank and AfDB have benefitted from this generosity.  Donor replenishments for 
these institutions’ concessional windows (International Development Association and 
African Development Fund) have experienced meteoric increases in recent years.  For 
example, the IDA-15 and AfDF-11 replenishment agreements (2009-2011) will provide 
funding levels nearly 90 percent higher than during the 2000-2002 period.  In dollar terms, 
these two organizations have roughly $23 billion more in deployable funding than during the 
2000-2002 period.  If utilized effectively, this funding will have profound positive effects on 
the daily lives of people living in poor countries through increased investments in health, 
education, infrastructure, and private sector activities.  At the same time, the sheer volume of 
financing can have destabilizing effects and can lead to renewed unsustainable debt burdens 
if provided in the form of new loans.  The problem of debt in low-income countries has 
motivated the push by the United States since 2000, and to a lesser extent other donors, to 
press for reliance on grant funding. 
 
Has the World Bank and AfDF moved to reduce lending volumes in recent years – especially 
given their risk of potentially creating yet another new external debt crisis in the very same 
countries?  Despite a relative shift to grant funding, lending volumes have remained very 
high in absolute terms.  This is especially striking following the progressively generous 
rounds of debt relief that cancelled billions of dollars in previous loans (Original HIPC, 
Enhanced HIPC, and MDRI).  In the two years immediately following MDRI (2006 and 
2007), the World Bank, AfDB, and IMF disbursed $7.8 billion in new loans to HIPCs – the 
very same countries that received debt relief during that same period.
9  This compares to $8.1 
billion in new loans immediately preceding MDRI (2004-2005).
10  See figure 1 below.  
Hence, while the World Bank and AfDB have provided a greater percentage of funding in 
the form of grants, overall increases in assistance levels (as noted above) has led to similar 








                                                 
9 Source:  OECD-DAC 
10 Ibid 4   




We also are witnessing a significant increase in IMF lending in response to the global 
economic crisis.  As of May 2009, new IMF lending to African countries had exceeded 
$1.5 billion (section IV deals with this issue in greater detail).  In late July 2009, the IMF 
Board of Directors approved a series of measures that could mobilize up to $17 billion in 
new loans to low-income countries through 2014.  Of this, up to $8 billion could be provided 
in the next two years.  The IMF will introduce short-term interest teaser rates, which are 
designed to reduce the near-term fiscal impact.  While this actual and projected lending will 
help boost international reserves and support structural adjustment policies in response to 
global shocks, they will further exacerbate the re-accumulation of new debts.  
 
While new lending volumes to HIPCs overall remain high compared to pre-debt relief 
periods, we must recognize that dynamics will vary by country.  Several HIPCs have 
maintained sustainable external indebtedness ratios following HIPC and MDRI relief, such 
as Mozambique.  However, many HIPCs’ debt ratios are projected to deteriorate 
substantially over the near- and medium-term due to decreased economic activity and 
increased borrowing volumes.  A few examples include: Ethiopia, Malawi, Nicaragua, and 
Sierra Leone.
11  While this paper examines external debt dynamics for HIPCs as an 
aggregated group, policymakers will need to take individual country circumstances into 
account as well. 
 
IV.  GROWTH PROJECTIONS 
 
Historically, aggressive IMF and World Bank growth projections were used to justify ever 
increasing levels of new loans to poor countries.  We examine recent projections for GDP 
and export growth in HIPCs to determine if systemic over-optimism has continued 
                                                 
11 World Bank and IMF, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief 





















IDA AfDF IMF5   
unchecked or been addressed conclusively.  Similar to previous studies (outlined below), we 
find further evidence of aggressive over-optimism across a number of different IMF data 
sources, such as IMF country reports (ex – Article IV reviews) and the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook database.   
 
GDP Growth Projections:  We have created a new GDP growth projection database for 
HIPCs covering the 1990-2007 period.
12  All data is derived from official IMF reports, such 
as country reports and program reviews.  This data and accompanying IMF staff analysis 
directly feeds into IFI lending decisions.  Our findings suggest that GDP growth projections 
remain very optimistic compared to actual performance.  On average, the IMF over-projects 
growth in HIPCs by greater than one percentage point annually (see figure 2 below).  Given 
the growth volatility experienced by conflict countries, we also calculate the average growth 
projection performance for non-conflict and presumably more stable countries.  Again, we 
find evidence of over-optimism – with growth projections outstripping performance by over 
0.8 percentage points a year (see Appendix II for several country-specific illustrations).  Out-
year projections (two- and three-year forecast figures) exhibit similar over-optimism.   
 




Source: IMF country reports and program review documents  
 
Some may argue that the IFIs have become more aware and conscious of their contribution 
to debt accumulation following the introduction of the HIPC Initiative.  However, GDP 
growth projections over a one-year time horizon remain more or less unchanged and three-
year projections have become even more optimistic (see figure 3 below).   
 
Figure 3 – IMF: Accuracy of GDP Growth Projections, 2000-2007 
 
 
Source: IMF country reports and program review documents  
 
With respect to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) forecasts
14, we find similar 
over-projections of GDP growth performance for HIPCs of nearly 1 percentage point a year 
                                                 
12 The dataset covers all HIPCs with the exception of Somalia due to lack of IMF country data.   
13 Figures represent the average differential between projected and actual growth figures.  Positive figures 
indicate projections that exceed actual performance.  Projections cover one-, two-, and three-year time horizons.   
14 According to the IMF, there may be inconsistencies between WEO data and those included in country reports 
and performance reviews due to methodological differences and timing issues.  Hence, we have examined both 
categories of data for illustration purposes.   
Forecast Period Average Observations Average Observations
1 Year 1.14 340 0.84 231
2 Years 1.62 274 1.00 187
3 Years 0.83 174 0.73 116
All HIPCs w/o Conflict Countries
Forecast Period HIPC Average (w/o Conflict)
1 Year 1.13 0.71
2 Year 0.80 0.82
3 Years 1.37 0.796   
between 2001 and 2006 (see figure 4 below).  At the same time, the IMF under-projected 
GDP growth for other low-income countries.  Interestingly, the IMF’s GDP growth 
projections were higher for HIPCs, on average, while this country group under-performed 
non-HIPCs in terms of actual GDP growth rates.  This contrast raises stark questions about 
why IMF staff consistently produce rosy growth projections for HIPCs while under-
forecasting growth in other low-income countries.  While outside the scope of this paper, this 
issue warrants further research.   
 




Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database 
 
Export Growth Projections:  With respect to exports, many HIPCs’ economies are 
concentrated in primary commodities and, therefore are highly vulnerable to volatility in 
world prices.  In recent years, surging primary commodity prices contributed to strong export 
performance.  Despite improved terms of trade, many countries still experienced a 
deterioration in their external indebtedness indicators during the same period.  Given extreme 
export concentration in a small number of commodity sectors, a reversal in the price of 
specific commodities can cause a serious deterioration in low-income countries’ external 
indebtedness indicators.  This occurs both through the denominator side (exports) and the 
numerator side (lending, including emergency IMF assistance).   
 
We are witnessing this fact in today’s difficult global economic environment.  The recent 
global downturn and related decline in commodity prices already has resulted in sharply 
reduced export levels and shocks for many HIPC economies.  For example, following lower 
copper prices and export receipts, Zambia has been forced to borrow roughly $170 million 
from the IMF to cover balance-of-payments needs.  The IMF also has approved an additional 
$160 million in PRGF loans for Zambia, which would bring the total amount to roughly $330 
million.
15  As Zambia received MDRI relief in 2006, including nearly $600 million from the 
IMF, it is alarming that it already is re-accumulating large, relatively expensive IMF loans. 
 
In a similar fashion, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has approached the IMF 
for emergency financial support following a sharp decline in commodity prices and export 
receipts.  Increased government spending to support the war effort in eastern Congo also 
contributed to the country’s deteriorated macroeconomic position.  In the response, the IMF 
approved $196 million in loans to the DRC in March 2009 through its Exogenous Shocks 
                                                 
15 IMF Press Release No. 09/147 
Country Category 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average Cum ∆
All Low-Income Countries -0.03 -1.05 0.37 1.58 -0.26 0.39 0.17 1.62
Non-HIPCs Only -0.91 -3.49 -0.61 0.55 -1.12 1.16 -0.74 -1.32
HIPCs Only 0.59 1.38 0.92 2.17 0.24 -0.06 0.87 3.36
African HIPCs 0.87 0.76 1.02 2.39 0.09 -0.03 0.85 3.66
Difference (HIPCs vs Non-HIPCs) 1.50 4.87 1.54 1.61 1.35 -1.22 1.61 1.74
(African HIPCs vs All) 1.78 4.24 1.64 1.84 1.20 -1.19 1.59 2.03
Negative figures indicate growth exceeded projections.7   
Facility.
16  This contrasts with the IMF’s ongoing commitment to provide roughly $320 
million in debt relief under the HIPC Initiative to the DRC.
17  Put differently, the new IMF 
loans are canceling out the impact of debt relief before it has even been provided.   
 
Given this structural vulnerability to trade shocks, have the IMF and World Bank taken steps 
to prudently project export growth performance?  Unfortunately, numerous studies have 
found significant systemic optimism in export growth projections.  In 2003, the World Bank 
itself acknowledged that export projections were significantly higher than actual historical 
performance – twice the levels from 1990-2000 and almost six times those from 1980-
2000.
18  Radelet and Chiang (2003) also compare staff projections for export and GDP 
growth and find similar results.
19  A more recent World Bank study (2006) argues that 
accuracy has improved slightly since the 1980-2000 period, but upward biases continue to 
undermine the validity of the World Bank and IMF debt sustainability framework.
20 
 
Inter-Temporal Implications:  Most striking, these GDP and export growth projections are 
for one or a few years – not the long-term growth projections currently used to justify new 
lending.  IDA and AfDF have standard loan repayment periods of 40 and 50 years, 
respectively.  As a result, it takes decades for respective countries to pay off new debt claims.  
Over this time horizon, systemically optimistic growth assumptions can have a massive 
impact on respective countries’ projected external debt-to-GDP and debt-to-export levels.  
While margins of error in GDP growth projections may not seem large in the near-term, the 
long-term implications can be substantial. 
 
The example of Guinea’s projected and actual GDP performance between 1992 and 2007 
provides an illustration of the stark cumulative implications (see Appendix III).  Based upon 
the IMF’s projected one-year GDP growth rates, Guinea’s economy would have reached $6.5 
billion by 2007.
 21  In reality, Guinea’s actual GDP reached only $4.6 billion – over 40 
percent lower than projected.  The IMF’s two-year GDP growth rate projections would have 
put Guinea’s economy even larger (nearly $7 billion) – or over 50 percent above actual 
achieved levels.  These GDP growth projections would have suggested that Guinea was able 
to take on nearly $2 billion in new loans without detrimentally impacting external 
indebtedness indicators.  If donors acted upon these aggressive growth projections – as the 
World Bank/IMF debt sustainability framework dictates – Guinea’s external debt situation 
would have been significantly worse.
22 
                                                 
16 IMF Press Release No. 09/74 
17 World Bank and IMF, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI) – Status of Implementation, September 2008 
18 Gautam, Madhur, “Debt Relief for the Poorest: An OED Review of the HIPC Initiative,” World Bank 
Operations Evaluation Department, 2003. 
19 Radelet, Steve and Hanley Chiang, “Providing New Financing to Low-Income Countries with High Levels of 
Debt: Some Considerations,” Issue Paper on Debt Sustainability, HIPC Unit, World Bank, Washington DC, 
August 2003. 
20 The World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, “Debt Relief for the Poorest: An Evaluation of the HIPC 
Initiative,” 2006. 
21 This figure is calculated by taking the cumulative and rolling impact of the IMF’s one-year projected growth 
rates over time. 
22 Guinea’s external indebtedness indicators already would have breached the World Bank/IMF debt 
sustainability framework thresholds during this time.  Therefore, the World Bank (IDA) and African 
Development Bank (AfDF) would not have provided new concessional loans.  Nonetheless, the example 8   
V.  COUNTRY PERFORMANCE VOLATILITY 
 
The new World Bank/IMF debt framework determines “sustainable” debt levels and lending 
decisions partly based upon the performance level of recipient governments.
 23  The 
underlying premise makes perfect sense; poorly governed countries are more likely to 
become debt-distressed at a lower external indebtedness level and better-performing 
countries can handle higher debt levels.  Performance levels are based upon the World 
Bank’s and African Development Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments 
(CPIA), which evaluate countries according to 16 policy categories.
24  Country scores range 
from 1 (low) to 6 (high).  Under the World Bank/IMF framework: 
 
•  “Strong” performing countries (CPIA score > 3.75) have a sustainable debt carrying 
capacity ratio of 200 percent (NPV debt/exports);  
 
•  “Medium” performing countries (3.25 < CPIA score < 3.75) have a sustainable 
capacity of 150 percent; and  
 
•  “Poor” performing countries (CPIA score < 3.25) have a sustainable capacity of 100 
percent.   
 
In operational terms, IDA and AfDF compare these debt distress thresholds against current 
and projected debt ratios to determine risk classifications.
25  In turn, these classifications 
determine whether a country should receive grants, loans, or a combination of the two (see 
figure 5 below).   
 
 




Volatility in country performance levels can have a significant impact on the risk of debt 
distress.  By illustration, a “strong” performing country with a NPV debt/export ratio of 180 
percent is considered sustainable under the debt sustainability framework.  However, if that 
                                                                                                                                                       
illustrates the stark dangers of relying on aggressive and over-optimistic growth projections under the debt 
sustainability framework to determine the appropriate mix of concessional loans and grant financing. 
23 See Aart Kraay and Vikram Nehru (2004), “When Is External Debt Sustainable?”  This empirical study finds 
that three factors explain a substantial percentage of cross-country and time-series variation in the incidence of 
debt distress: (1) overall debt burden; (2) the quality of country policies and institutions, and (3) the incidence 
of external shocks.  The World Bank and IMF utilized these findings and associated confidence intervals to 
establish the debt sustainability framework for governing new lending decisions. 
24 See www.worldbank.org/ida for background information on the World Bank’s Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA).   
25 While the IMF helped create the Low-Income Country Debt Sustainability Framework, it does not utilize it to 
govern its own lending decisions.  
High-Risk (Debt Ratios Significantly Higher than Debt Distress Thresholds) 100% Grants
Medium-Risk (Debt Ratios Near Thresholds) 50% Loans, 50% Gran
Low-Risk (Debt Ratios Well Below Thresholds) 100% Loans9   
country declines to a “medium” performance category, then it now can sustainably carry only 
a NPV debt/export ratio of 150 percent.  Therefore, this deterioration in performance would 
immediately place the country at a statistically-significant probability of experiencing debt 
distress.  Given this inherent threat, we examine the prevalence and persistence of 
deteriorated country performance over time. 
 
The World Bank and AfDB utilize a three-year moving average of a given country’s CPIA 
score to determine its appropriate debt distress risk classification.  There is no empirical 
underpinning for the three-year moving average; it is designed solely to smooth out lending 
decisions for the World Bank and AfDB (i.e., to prevent grant allocation shares from 
fluctuating on an annual basis to reflect sustainable lending limits).  In September 2009, the 
World Bank and IMF Boards approved additional actions to create further “inertia” in 
lending decisions.  Despite these attempts to artificially smooth volatility in actual country 
performance; we find that governments still experience significant variance over time (see 
Appendix IV). 
 
By illustration, the Gambia would have changed performance categories eight times during 
the 1979-2007 period.  This includes a successive two-category decline between 1980 and 
1982 (from "strong" to "poor").  Alternatively, Mauritania would have changed performance 
categories five times – including a successive two-category decline between 2004 and 2006 
(from "strong" to "poor").  These examples are by no means isolated occurrences.  Between 
1979 and 2007, 29 HIPCs experienced a decline in their three-year moving average 
performance and debt distress category score levels.  On average, each of these countries 
experienced an average of 3 declines over this period, with the decreased performance level 
continuing on average for 8 years.  Between 1999 and 2007, 13 HIPCs experienced and/or 
continued a decline in their 3-year moving performance and debt distress category score.  On 
average, the decreased performance level continued for 5 years. 
 
The prevalence and persistence of performance declines over time again highlight the 
challenge of basing large volumes of new loans with 40- or 50-year amortization schedules 
on current performance levels that are likely to change.  Some may argue that the World 
Bank and AfDB can modify lending levels in reaction to declined performance.  
Unfortunately, the current loan maturities simply are too long to facilitate timely 
adjustments.  That is the equivalent of turning an aircraft carrier on a dime.  Once the loans 
are made, they will remain on the books for decades to come (absent debt relief).  Given this, 
the World Bank and AfDB should exercise significant caution in incorporating country 
performance levels into lending decisions.   
 
Some may argue that HIPCs’ performance levels have improved in recent years and are no 
longer vulnerable to the same level of historical volatility.  Despite recent slippages, HIPCs’ 
performance levels as a group has risen steadily since the late 1970s (see figure 6 below).  
However, the improvement has not been sufficiently large to force a widespread shift in debt 
sustainability performance categories.  For example, 11 HIPCs’ CPIA scores in 2007 would 
have produced a re-classification in their debt distress category compared to performance 
levels in 1999 (6 deteriorated and 5 improved).  This clearly shows that volatility remains a 
pressing issue.   
 10   
Figure 6 – Average HIPC CPIA Score: 1979 – 2007  
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Moreover, several studies have found a statistical deviation between World Bank and 
African Development Bank CPIA country scores.  Gelb, Ngo, and Ye (2004), estimate a 
standard deviation of 0.24 between each institution’s respective performance scores for 
African countries.  In light of these findings, they argue that a confidence interval of 0.5 
would be reasonable.
26  This interval is very large when compared to the World Bank/IMF 
framework performance category cutoffs (3.25 and 3.75).  This problem is especially acute 
given the clustering of low-income country CPIA scores around these cutoffs.  Our analysis 
suggests that 54 IDA-eligible countries’ three-year average CPIA scores (out of 75 total) are 
within 0.5 points of the performance category cutoffs (see Figure 7 below).  In other words, 
over 70 percent of IDA-eligible countries may be labeled incorrectly (either positively or 









                                                 
26 Gelb, Alan, Brian Ngo, and Xiao Ye (2004), “Implementing Performance-Based Aid in Africa: The Country 



































































































































Average CPIA Score11   
Figure 7 – CPIA Performance Clustering and Potential Labeling Errors 
 
Source: World Bank CPIA data and author calculations 
 
Kaufman and Kraay (2008) find an even larger divergence between specific sub-categories 
of World Bank and African Development Bank CPIA assessments.  They find that the 
correlation between country scores on the CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption 
sub-indicator is only 0.67.
27  Undoubtedly, every performance indicator will be subject to 
measurement error.  However, these findings argue for significant prudence concerning the 
application of the CPIA (or other performance indicators) to mechanistic lending 
frameworks.  
 
VI.  POLICY OPTIONS 
 
Recognizing these structural and organizational limitations, how should IFI shareholders 
proceed?  We recommend that they give careful consideration to a number of policy options 
during the upcoming IDA and AfDF replenishment negotiations, which presents a good 
opportunity to take corrective action.  There are a number of possible policy options – 
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The CPIA confidence interval of 0.5 
recommended by Gelb, Ngo and Xe (2004) 
would suggest that: 
• 6 countries may be incorrectly labeled as 
"strong" performers;
• 26 countries may be incorrectly labeled as 
"medium" performers; and 
• 22 countries may be incorrectly labeled as 
"poor" performers.12   
ranging from a wholesale rejection of the debt sustainability framework to more targeted 
measures aimed at fixing the framework’s shortcomings.  A few options include:    
 
(1) Fix the Debt Sustainability Framework:  IFIs shareholders may wish to focus on 
implementing targeted corrections for the Debt Sustainability Framework’s existing 
shortcomings.  There are a number of possible options, such as: 
 
(a) Incentivize Conservative Growth Projections:  IFI management could consider 
ways to institutionalize more conservative GDP and export growth projections.  
One approach is to incorporate the accuracy of projections into relevant 
employees’ performance reviews and compensation packages.   
 
(b) Static Repayment Capacity Guidelines:  IDA and AfDF could determine 
appropriate lending terms based upon existing debt sustainability levels and not 
projected debt carrying capacity over time.  This is similar to how private banks 
determine repayment capacity for mortgages and automotive loans.  This 
approach would directly address the ongoing problem of overly-optimistic growth 
projections.   
 
(c) Significant Cushions:  IDA and AfDF could assume that overly-optimistic 
projections will continue and adjust the respective external debt ratios utilized to 
determine debt distress thresholds.  By illustration, the debt sustainability 
framework’s distress threshold for a “strong” performing country could be 
adjusted downward to allow a sustainable debt carrying capacity of 150 percent 
(NPV debt/exports) instead of 200 percent.  This shift would ensure that a 
substantial buffer is structurally built into the framework, which would help offset 
systemic overly-optimistic growth projections or volatility in country 
performance levels. 
 
(2) Jettison the Debt Sustainability Framework as a Grants vs. Loans Decision Mechanism:  
Given the continuing overly-optimistic growth projections and country governance 
volatility, IFI shareholders may wish to discard the debt sustainability framework 
entirely as the primary tool for determining appropriate lending terms.  In its place, IFIs 
could utilize simple or sliding income thresholds for low-income countries.
28  The Inter-
American Development Bank utilizes a sliding income scale to determine appropriate 
loan concessionality terms for many countries, including most low-income countries.
29  
Moreover, IDA and AfDF utilized income levels as one factor in determining grant 
assistance levels during the IDA-13 and AfDF-9 replenishment periods.
30   
 
                                                 
28 See Steve Radelet (2005), “Grants for the World’s Poorest: How the World Bank Should Distribute Its 
Funds”, Center for Global Development.  See also Nancy Birdsall & Devesh Kapur (2005), “The Hardest Job in 
the World: Five Crucial Tasks for the New President of the World Bank,” Center for Global Development. 
29 The IDB’s Intermediate Financing Facility provides a sliding scale of concessionality terms for countries 
based upon income levels.  This facility subsidizes regular Ordinary Capital (OC) lending terms to achieve the 
targeted concessionality level.  Several low-income countries are eligible for facility subsidies, including: 
Bolivia, Guyana, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
30 If countries’ GDP per capita was less than $360, then they were eligible to receive up to 40 percent of total 
replenishment assistance envelopes in the form of grants. 13   
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Recent evidence suggests that the World Bank, AfDB, and IMF have not taken aggressive 
action to reform their growth projections and lending decisions.  The new debt sustainability 
framework clearly represents a substantial step in the right direction.  However, the 
framework itself is only as good as its analytical inputs.  Without conservative and accurate 
GDP and export growth projections, the framework will not prevent future instances of HIPC 
debt distress.  Equally important, the prevalence of country performance volatility 
necessitates a significant buffer in external indebtedness ratios compared to sustainable 
levels.  This will help to prevent future instances of debt distress in the event that HIPCs 
experience declines in performance levels.  Moreover, the World Bank and AfDB clearly 
need to utilize grant financing more extensively.  Given that nearly every donor provides 
contributions to these institutions on a grant-basis; it is not unreasonable to expect that they 
would provide the same terms to the world’s poorest countries.  If not, and if the World Bank 
and IMF do not rein in their systemic over-optimism, then the international community could 
be looking at a HIPC IV agreement in the not too distant future.  In the meantime, donors 
will be on the hook to provide tens of billions of dollars in additional contributions to the 
World Bank, AfDB, and IMF to cover the last round of debt relief.   
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Appendix I 
 
Low-Income Countries: Chronology of Debt Treatments 
 
The following chronology shows the increasingly generous debt treatments offered over 
time:  
 
•  From the 1960s through the mid-1980s, Paris Club debt relief for low-income countries 
was limited to rescheduling of claims.  
 
•  In 1987, the Group of Seven countries (G-7) called for interest rate relief on low-income 
countries’ debt, creating the “Venice terms.”  
 
•  In 1988, the Paris Club agreed on partial debt reduction (33 percent) and more generous 
rescheduling terms, creating “Toronto terms.”  
 
•  In 1991, the Paris Club applied “Enhanced Toronto Terms,” which deepened the level of 
debt reduction to 50 percent.  
 
•  In 1994, the Paris Club announced “Naples Terms” with even deeper levels of debt re-
duction (67 percent) and more generous rescheduling terms on remaining debt.  
 
•  In 1996, members of the IMF and World Bank agreed on the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Country Debt Initiative (HIPC). For the first time IFI credits were reduced. Paris Club 
creditors agreed to “Lyon Terms,” which increased debt reduction on eligible non-
concessional bilateral claims to 80 percent.  
 
•  In 1999, the international donor community agreed to the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, pro-
viding faster and even deeper debt relief, for more countries. Paris Club creditors agreed 
to the “Cologne Terms,” canceling up to 90 percent of eligible non-concessional bilateral 
obligations. Some G-7 creditors, including the United States, went as far as 100 percent 
debt reduction. 
 
•  In 2006, the World Bank, African Development Bank, and International Monetary Fund 
agreed to provide 100 percent debt stock reduction for qualifying HIPCs.  The Inter-
American Development Bank agreed to equivalent treatment soon thereafter. 15   
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Appendix III 
 
Guinea:  IMF GDP Growth Projections Versus Actual Performance, 1992-2007 
 
 























GDP Actual GDP Projected (w/ IMF 1-Year Forecasted Growth Rates) GDP Projected (w/ IMF 2-Year Forecasted Growth Rates)
 Based on annual IMF GDP growth 
projections, Guinea's economy would 
 have reached $6.5 billion.  In reality, 
 it's GDP was $4.6 billion - over 40 
 percent lower. 
 Based on annual IMF two-year GDP  
 growth projections, Guinea's economy 
 would have reached $6.9 billion.  In 
reality, it's GDP was $4.6 billion - over 
 50 percent lower. 17   
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Sustainable Debt/Exp = 200%
"Poor Performers" Sustainable 
Debt/Exp = 100%
"Medium Performers" 
Sustainable Debt/Exp = 150%
   Key Findings:
 •  Based on its CPIA scores, the Gambia would have                
    changed performance categories eight times during the  
    1979-2007 period.  This includes a successive two-
    category decline between 1980-1982 (from "strong" to 
    "poor").
 •  Mauritania would have changed performance categories  
    five times.  This includes a successive two-category 
    decline between 2004-2006 (from "strong" to "poor").